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Abstract 
We analyze behavioral additionality effects related to wage-based R&D tax credits and their 
dependence on the joint use of R&D subsidies. Using a matching approach combined with 
multivariate probit analyses on survey data of Belgian firms in 2006-2010, we find that tax 
credits cause firms not to ‘do more of the same’ (scale) nor ‘do the same thing faster’ (speed) 
but rather induce them to make more resolute changes to their R&D approach. In particular, 
firms are found to initiate additional R&D projects and tip the R&D-balance more towards 
research relative to development. The latter effect indicates that tax credits nudge firms’ 
behavior towards those activities characterized by the most severe market failures. 
Furthermore, the behavioral additionality effects are found to increase with the relative 
importance of the tax credit for the firm. Finally, the effects of tax credits are positively 
moderated by R&D subsidies i.e. we find that a policy mix combining tax credits and 
subsidies is more effective than using tax credits only. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal incentives have been used as enablers of R&D activity in a number of countries for a 
few decades now. The number of OECD members offering fiscal support for R&D more than 
doubled between 1995 and 2011 and equals three out of four. At the same time, the ratio of 
indirect versus direct support increased in close to half of the countries and is now at least of 
equal importance as R&D subsidies in over one third of the countries (OECD, 2013). 
Consequently, the number of studies on the effects of indirect R&D support measures 
increased markedly in the past few years, as data became available. Additionality of R&D tax 
credits has been considered in recent studies in terms of effects on R&D inputs and outputs 
(Köhler et al., 2012), but also on economic performance (Cappelen et al., 2007; Czarnitzki et 
al., 2011). However, in spite of a large and growing body of empirical work the effects of 
such fiscal policies are not yet fully understood (Köhler et al., 2012; Lokshin & Mohnen, 
2012; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). 
Our paper addresses behavioral additionality related to a volume based wage-related R&D tax 
credit and connects these differences to the policy mix of tax credits and R&D subsidies. 
Behavioral additionality refers to the difference a policy makes in the behavior of the 
supported firms (Buisseret et al., 1995; Georghiou, 2002). The interest in behavioral 
additionality stems from the fact that the traditional input and output additionality concepts 
are thought to be limited in terms of capturing in a comprehensive manner the impact of 
public intervention on the innovation process itself (Georghiou, 2002; Falk, 2007).  
So far, the behavioral additionality stream of literature has largely been ignored when it 
comes to additionality of R&D tax credits. This paper addresses this gap and, moreover, 
builds on prior work by taking into consideration the fact that firms often undergo multiple 
‘treatments’, i.e. a combination of R&D tax credits and R&D subsidies. The additionality 
stemming from the blending of two or more public funding schemes has been addressed much 
less in previous research (see e.g. Falk et al., 2009). By analyzing the combined effect of 
subsidies and tax credits, we fill a gap in the empirical literature on the synergies arising from 
the use of multiple R&D policy support measures. The potential for such synergies to occur – 
and the difficulty to assess them – stems from the inherent differences between direct and 
indirect support measures in terms of characteristics and goals. In particular, tax incentives 
tend not to interfere with general market mechanisms, have lower selectivity in terms of 
companies and industries, are easier to integrate in long-term financial planning and reduce 
the administrative burden compared to subsidies (Köhler et al., 2012). 
In line with the growing attention to R&D policy mixes – but so far only applied on input and 
output additionality (see e.g. Lhuillery et al., 2013; Busom et al., 2012; Arqué and Mohnen, 
2012), we explore different levels of ‘mixtures’ of tax credits and R&D subsidies by paying 
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attention to the (relative) importance of the tax credit and of subsidies in the overall firm 
R&D activities. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
behavioral additionality and formulates hypotheses on the role of tax credits and the broader 
R&D policy mix. The third section provides background information on the availability and 
use of R&D subsidies and tax credits in Belgium and discusses the survey data and the 
empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the results and reports on various robustness checks. 
We conclude with a reflection on the main insights from our analysis for policy, and indicate 
avenues for further research. 
2. Literature review 
In this section, we give a more elaborate motivation for our focus on behavioral additionality 
and clarify how this paper builds on prior research. We first explain the concept of behavioral 
additionality and the way it can be measured. Next, we relate it to the importance of tax 
credits and to the R&D policy mix. 
2.1. Behavioral additionality 
The concept of behavioral additionality refers to permanent changes in firm processes and 
behavior as a result of policy intervention, such as newly acquired competences, the entry into 
new business areas or a change in working processes (Bach & Matt, 2002). Such changes 
occur due to learning effects and knowledge spillovers (Clarysse et al., 2009). 
The growing interest in behavioral additionality results from the fact that the traditional input 
and output additionality concepts can be questioned in terms of their ability to adequately 
capture the impact of public intervention on the innovation process itself (Falk, 2007). More 
specifically, it has been argued that government support can not only be motivated based on 
the neoclassical market failure argument, i.e. the aim to address underinvestment in 
knowledge production (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962), but can alternatively be prompted from 
an evolutionary-systemic policy perspective (Flanagan et al., 2011; Magro & Wilson, 2013). 
This perspective provides an alternative rationale for policy intervention in the sense that the 
primary purpose shifts to modify (in a permanent way) the firm’s approach to R&D. This 
view naturally translates into behavioral additionality as a complementary way to evaluate 
policy support measures, besides the ‘classical’ input and output additionality approaches 
(Georghiou, 2002). Attention for behavioral additionality as an evaluation concept has further 
been justified by the argument that persistent changes in firm behavior create the necessary 
condition for a policy's ability to eventually induce output additionality (Davenport & Grimes, 
cit. in Georghiou, 2002, p59). Moreover, it is methodologically challenging to judge the 
effectiveness of public support in terms of output additionality, e.g. due to long lags before 
‘sleeper technologies’ find a productive use (Luukkonen, 2000). 
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Behavioral additionality fits within an ‘evolutionary-structuralist’ perspective if the policy 
intervention ultimately leads not only to adjustments in the approach to R&D, but also to a 
change in cognitive capacity of the firm (Bach & Matt, 2002). 
The OECD report on behavioral additionality (OECD, 2006) highlights that Finnish 
companies that had received R&D funding for specific projects mostly agreed that this 
permitted them to focus on long-term, but also riskier research. In Japan, national research 
funding allowed companies to engage in large-scale research projects and, to a greater extent, 
to improve the efficiency of R&D. Another series of case studies presented in the report 
investigate the impact of government support on R&D activities of firms, including 
accelerating projects or set-up of projects with higher technological challenges. These studies 
focused on behavioral additionality and made use of surveys and interviews. However, their 
results only refer to direct R&D public grants, rather than tax incentives – as is the case for 
our study – for which robust econometric estimations are scarce. 
Falk (2007) integrates previous insights and addresses scope additionalities (expanded 
coverage of an activity to a wider range of markets, applications or players), advancement 
into new research areas (possibly reflected in a greater risk profile of the innovation projects), 
new partnerships between the business and academic spheres (resulting in cognitive capacity 
additionality – Bach and Matt, 2002), the timing of the project (acceleration additionalities 
which – if going hand in hand with scope additionality – can also result in long-term projects 
geared toward strategic objectives), and scale additionalities (engagement in larger innovation 
projects). Falk (2007) emphasizes that different aspects of behavioral additionality can and 
should be addressed in order to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of a policy measure. 
Georghiou (2002) refers to the UK Department of Trade and Industry that uses the 
subcategories scale, acceleration and scope additionality for measuring behavioral 
additionality.2 
Different indicators have been proposed to empirically pin down the concept of behavioral 
additionality. In our data, we observe the following dimensions of a firm’s R&D activities: 
scale, speed of execution, the ratio of ‘R’ (research) versus ‘D’ (development)3, and the 
number of distinct projects that the firm is running (details will be given in section 3 and their 
relation with tax credits will be made clear at the beginning of section 2.2). These R&D 
descriptors allow assessing key aspects of behavioral additionality as they have been put 
forward in the literature. While not all of the 4 outcome variables at our disposal map clearly 
onto one of these dimensions, we believe the set of outcomes available in the survey allows 
                                                
2 Note that even more dimensions of behavioral additionality have been proposed in the literature, such as the 
expansion of a firm’s network (‘network additionality’, see for example Idea Consult & Clarysse, 2006). In our 
empirical analysis, we do not have measures for such outcomes, so we necessarily leave them out of scope. 
3Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014), in their literature review, reveal that studies that consider the impact of public 
support on research and development separately provide inconclusive results. 
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for a meaningful analysis of firms’ behavioral responses to (a combination of) of R&D 
subsidies and tax credits. 
2.2. Behavioral additionality effects as a function of the importance of tax 
credits 
A key feature of R&D tax credits that motivates our interest in assessing their behavioral 
additionality effects is that the financial resources that become available through the tax credit 
can be freely spent by the firm. In other words, it is a distinct possibility that tax credits are 
not spent on R&D (deadweight loss – see Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012). Alternatively, they 
may be channeled to R&D activities, but in ways that do not represent a fundamental 
departure of the firm’s usual way of doing R&D. In particular, the firm may increase the 
staffing of current projects, which may affect the scale4 and/or speed of execution, without 
really changing the firm’s R&D agenda. Conversely, a firm may also opt to take on additional 
R&D projects, or change the balance between ‘research’ and ‘development’ in its R&D 
portfolio. 
Behavioral additionality effects of R&D tax credits are not guaranteed and, if they occur, may 
manifest themselves in different ways. In line with prior work that has found evidence of 
behavioral additionality due to R&D subsidies (Falk, 2007; Georghiou, 2002, Clarysse et al., 
2009) we hypothesize a positive effect on the scale, speed, number of projects and ratio of R 
versus D thanks to the reduction of wages of highly qualified R&D personnel. 
We do not explicitly disentangle our hypothesis conditional on the outcome variable: this 
exploratory approach seems justified since prior work provides few handles to argue 
differential effects. However, given that we observe multiple outcome variables, which are 
only partially correlated, we can infer the firm’s use of the tax credit from (the absence of) 
differential changes in these outcomes. First, if a firm redirects the reduction in wage costs to 
non-R&D activities or if R&D employees bargain for higher wages compensating the wage 
subsidy, then the tax credit will not have an effect on any of the outcome variables. Estimates 
by Goolsbee (1998) for the US and Haegeland and Møen (2007) for Norway indicate an 
important impact on wages by the R&D tax credit. For the Netherlands, Lokshin and Mohnen 
(2012) calculated that this effect reduces the effectiveness of Dutch tax incentives for R&D 
by 25 percent. 
Conversely, if the firm does invest more in R&D then there will be a positive effect but which 
outcome variables are affected most depends on the precise response of the firm. First, if the 
firm decides to replace R&D workers who are not eligible for the measure by highly-qualified 
people who comply with the necessary formalities – and who therefore are likely to command 
                                                
4 Note that a firm may also respond by replacing employees who work on R&D projects but who are not eligible 
for the tax credit by people who do meet the formal requirements in terms of educational qualification. In that 
case, scale (in terms of people) would be unaffected by the tax credit.  
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higher wages – then this has an impact on the skill base of the company rather than the total 
R&D (wo)manpower. Hence, we may primarily expect an upward influence on the ratio of 
Research versus Development and/or the number of projects5. This without disregarding the 
differences and complementarities between research and development activities of companies 
in terms of aims, people, management style and outcomes (Barge-Gil & López, 2013). An 
alternative response could be that the firm does not engage in increasing the share of highly 
qualified R&D workers but instead chooses to hire more people to help executing R&D work, 
e.g. lab technicians, who do not represent a substantial expansion of the firm’s expertise. In 
that case, one would first and foremost expect an effect on the scale and speed of R&D 
activities, rather than the other, more scope-oriented outcomes. The distinction between basic 
and applied research and more commercially oriented development interferes with our 
measure capturing more research-oriented behavior (OECD, 2002). While the actual reaction 
of a given firm will end up somewhere along the spectrum of skill-upgrading versus pure 
capacity-building, these alternatives provide a useful framework for making sense of 
differential effects across the sub-dimensions of behavioral additionality. 
In addition, we hypothesize a volume-induced behavioral additionality effect of the tax credit: 
firms with a higher share of employees benefiting from R&D tax credits are expected to 
exhibit stronger BA effects. The intuition is that specialized human capital is the key input 
into the R&D process, so if a larger share of the firm’s staff benefits from this measure, we 
expect a stronger effect.  
Hypothesis 1: the behavioral additionality effects of R&D tax credits increase with the 
importance of these tax credits for the firm. 
2.3. Behavioral additionality of R&D tax credits in the presence of R&D 
subsidies 
There is a long-standing interest in the interactions that may arise in a ‘mix’ of policy 
instruments: Cunningham et al. (2013) trace the emergence of the policy mix concept in the 
policy-oriented literature back to the 1990s. Supported by the growing emphasis on a 
systemic view of innovation scholars and policy makers have banked on the concept to better 
understand the complexities in stimulating innovation. (Nauwelaers et al., 2009; OECD, 
2010). Despite the need of a more comprehensive approach for evaluating the interactions 
between different support measures (Diez, 2002; Aranguren et al., 2013), the policy mix 
concept remains a rather ill defined and under-conceptualized term (Flanagan et al., 2011). In 
this paper, we operationalize the policy mix as the joint use of R&D tax incentives and 
subsidies, which are by far the two most important policy instruments used to stimulate 
                                                
5 Under the assumption that a more diverse skill base represents an incentive to undertake more projects where 
those skills are put to use. 
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private R&D activity (OECD, 2010). We briefly introduce the key differences between these 
instruments in terms of their objectives and use by firms. 
In general, subsidies provide up-front financing independent of the firm's tax position and are 
more interesting for firms facing appropriability difficulties. Subsidies may also help to attract 
additional funding since they provide a certification effect, unlike tax credits (Takalo & 
Tanayama, 2010). On the other hand, tax incentives typically require less administrative 
burden and do not suffer from winner-picking by government agencies, but require that the 
firm has the capacity to appropriate the returns of its innovation to benefit from the measure 
(Busom et al., 2012). Related to the latter argument, tax incentives are more likely to benefit 
stable R&D performers, whereas subsidies tend to increase the number of R&D performers 
(Busom et al., 2012; Arqué and Mohnen, 2012). 
In terms of criteria, subsidies are typically awarded based on innovative content of the 
proposal, technical ability of the firm and potential market (Busom et al., 2012; Takalo et al., 
2011). Conversely, R&D tax credits do not require the approval of a specific government 
agency and funding is provided irrespective of the quality of the project. An advantage of a 
tax-based subsidy is that it leaves the choice of how to conduct and pursue R&D programs in 
the hands of the private sector and thus avoids inefficiencies due to uninformed steering of 
firms’ R&D (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). At the same time, this allows firms to fund R&D 
projects that yield the highest private return rather than the ones with the highest social value 
(David et al., 2000). Furthermore, the existence of tax deductibles may tempt firms to game 
the system, for example by labeling expenses as research activities while in fact they are 
related to other kinds of business activities only vaguely related to research (Antonelli and 
Crespi, 2011).6 R&D subsidies that impose conditions on the execution of R&D may, in 
principle, improve allocation decisions, but issues like asymmetric information, lobbying and 
red tape may lead to suboptimal funding decisions (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000).  
Given that the policy goals and granting mechanisms of tax credits and subsidies are quite 
different, it is not trivial to predict the results when they are used jointly. In fact, little is 
known about the interaction between R&D tax incentives and direct subsidies for R&D. More 
in general, which particular form public support should be used to correct for market failures 
is not clear, nor is the question whether or not there exists an optimal mix of tax credits and 
subsidies (Busom et al., 2012). 
Most existing input or output additionality studies that consider multiple instruments do not 
analyze interactions. Cunningham et al. (2012) report higher success levels of firms that 
combine direct and indirect support. Haegeland and Møen (2007) find that both subsidies and 
tax credits lead to input additionality but they don’t explicitly study interactions. Carboni 
                                                
6 As we will explain in section 3.1, this is not an issue for tax credits in Belgium since they effectively function 
as a wage credit rather than a deductible on firm profits. 
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(2011) studies Italian firms and finds evidence of input additionality with tax incentives 
appearing be more effective than direct grants, although grants encouraged the use of funding 
sources internal to the firm. Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2009) find evidence of a stepping 
stone logic, with Spanish firms that receive a subsidy being more likely to take advantage of 
the tax credit. Finally, Falk (2007) reports evidence that firms enjoying a mix of direct and 
indirect measures have a higher likelihood to innovate radically. 
Bérubé & Mohnen (2009) apply matching estimators to show that Canadian firms using a mix 
of tax credits and subsidies have a higher innovative performance than firms using only tax 
credits. We will follow a similar set-up in this paper, albeit that we will zoom in on behavioral 
additionality rather than innovation outputs.  
As a first contribution to the literature on the policy mix of R&D, we analyze whether 
subsidies moderate the behavioral additionality effects of tax credits. The intuition for such an 
interaction effect is the following. While R&D subsidies are targeted towards specific R&D 
projects, there may be ‘spillovers’ with respect to the way R&D tax credits are used by the 
firm. In order to justify the existence of such spillovers, one needs to answer the question 
what the subsidy (i.e. R&D project) accomplishes in terms of changing the R&D environment 
such that the firm uses the tax credit differently than firms who do not enjoy an R&D subsidy. 
We argue that it may be a very real possibility that subsidized firms direct the financial 
resources freed up by the tax incentive towards the subsidized project(s). In other words, 
those financial resources may find a ‘productive home’ within the context of the subsidized 
project.7 More specifically, the subsidized R&D projects may serve as a roadmap, pointing 
out a more productive way for allocating additional R&D resources. For example, the tax 
credit may create room for additional experimentation that the firm otherwise would not have 
undertaken. In contrast, unsubsidized firms may be more conservative in spending the tax 
credit i.e. by doing more incremental R&D. This link between subsidies and tax credits ties 
into earlier work (Corchuelo & Martínez-Ros, 2009), which found that firms that use 
subsidies are more likely to employ tax credits as well. We expect that the internal awareness 
and R&D procedures that enable firms to tap into both measures extend to resource allocation 
decisions. 
Hypothesis 2: the behavioral additionality effects of R&D tax credits are stronger for firms 
that also receive an R&D subsidy versus firms that only benefit from tax credits. 
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the key variables and the formulated hypotheses.  
 
                                                
7 Note that our interest is in the behavioral additionality effects of the tax credit, but nothing excludes the firm’s 
use of the tax credit for the subsidized projects. 
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Figure 1: Overview of hypotheses 
 
3. Background, Data & Method 
3.1. R&D subsidies and R&D tax credits in Belgium 
Since our empirical analysis is based on Belgian data, in this section we highlight the main 
features of the R&D tax credit and subsidy system. A first important remark is that fiscal 
policy – and thus R&D tax credits – are a federal authority while R&D subsidies are 
predominantly8 awarded by the three regions, i.e. Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels Capital 
Region. 
As in many other countries (Busom et al., 2012; OECD, 2013), R&D subsidies have long 
been the most important source of direct funding for R&D in Belgium. Subsidy policies are 
largely inspired by a bottom-up approach, meaning that they are tailored to the specificities of 
the enterprises located in the region. Important aims of the programs include fostering co-
operative research and innovation networking, in order to stimulate the use of scientific 
knowledge. R&D subsidies tend to be not primarily aimed at broadening the R&D portfolio of 
firms but rather seek to lower the threshold towards innovative projects with higher risk 
factors and some of the funding programs are exclusively oriented towards small and medium 
sized enterprises (Teirlinck & Spithoven, 2012). 
Only more recently – since 2006 – R&D tax credits have been introduced on a larger scale.  
The focus in our paper is on the additionality effects related to the introduction of the R&D 
tax credit, or, more accurately, the possibility for private firms to be partially exempted of the 
‘wage-withholding tax’ for highly qualified R&D personnel. The operation of the measure is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
                                                
8 About three fourths of the budget for R&D subsidies comes from the regions. 
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Figure 2: Operation of the R&D tax credit as a wage subsidy 
 
The tax credit was introduced in January 2006 for researchers holding a PhD in exact or 
applied sciences, (veterinarian) medicines, or civil engineering. At the beginning of 2007 it 
was extended to researchers with a master’s degree, with the exception of masters in the 
social sciences and humanities. The rate of exemption amounted to 25% and was increased to 
65% in July 2008, to 75% in January 2009, and (out of scope for our analysis) augmented to 
80% from June 2013 onwards. 
There is high persistence in tax credit usage, with a very limited number of companies9 
abandoning the system once they started using it.10 This implies that, the effects reported by 
beneficiary companies in the survey conducted in 2011 (discussed in the following section) 
tend to include the effects of the measure at its highest level of benefit to the companies and 
we can disregard the fact that the level of the tax benefit steadily increased over time. 
As stated in the previous section, the exempted tax amount can be freely used by the 
company. While a strict condition to channel this reduction in wage cost back to R&D is 
absent, the aim of the policy measure is to stimulate R&D, and more particularly the 
employment of highly qualified researchers, as referred to in the earlier discussion of 
hypothesis 1. In this sense the tax credit measure is different from many other countries (see 
e.g. Busom et al., 2012) in which it is depending on profit making by the company and it is a 
delayed and less certain R&D cost reduction (or revenue). 
                                                
9 Only 101 companies out of the cumulative population of tax credit users in between 2006 and 2009 have 
abandoned their use of the measure. 
10 Note that since the ‘tax credit’ effectively operates as a wage subsidy, a firm need not report a profit to benefit 
from the measure. 
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Both R&D tax credits by the federal government and R&D subsidies by regional governments 
represent sizeable public support for innovation in the business sector (8.4% of total Business 
Expenditures on R&D in the year 2009). By 2009, 1,086 companies benefitted from the tax 
credit, representing a reduction in wage cost of 225 million Euros. For R&D subsidies by 
regional governments, 160 million Euros were spent towards the private enterprise sector for 
558 companies. The median tax credit per beneficiary company is 49,000 Euro compared to 
86,000 Euro in the case of subsidies (Dumont, 2012). 
3.2. Data 
In June 2011 the Belgian Science Policy Office conducted an electronic questionnaire aimed 
to assess the behavioral additionality effects of the R&D tax credit measure explained in the 
previous section. The poll was sent to all firms in Belgium that were also surveyed in the 
2010 OECD business R&D survey, which is based on the exhaustive inventory of 2,706 
(quasi-)permanent R&D-active firms in the country. The electronic questionnaire yielded 412 
responses. After internal consistency checks and removal of incomplete answers, a total of 
192 firms provided information about all variables necessary for the analysis conducted in this 
paper. Data from the survey was combined with firm characteristics drawn from the Amadeus 
Financials database. 
To assess the representativeness of sample respondents for the population of 1,131 R&D tax 
credit users in 2009 – the most recent year we have data for – both groups have been 
compared with respect to a broad array of firm characteristics. These include the overall firm 
size, sector and region of activity, current ratio, R&D intensity (share of researchers in total 
employees) and firm age, as well as the percentage of firms that have used the tax credit from 
2006 (tax leaders). Statistical tests of differences in the means for the sample (i.e. firms in the 
survey) versus the population of tax credit users indicate that – while the sample is relatively 
small – it allows for a valid analysis11. 
We define our analysis sample as the surveyed companies that have used the tax credit 
(N=192), and we distinguish among them those that also used R&D subsidies (N=117). Thus, 
the control group comprises companies that have accessed the tax credit but not subsidies 
(N=75), and the treatment group is defined as using both measures.  
The following indicators of firms’ behavior in terms of R&D are available in the survey: 
scale, speed of execution, the ratio of ‘R’ (research) versus ‘D’ (development), and the 
number of R&D projects. More specifically, firms were asked12 to what extent – on a 5-point 
Likert scale - the R&D tax credit affected each of these four behavioral outcomes relative to 
the counterfactual situation of not using the tax credit. As a way to deal with issues like 
                                                
11 The only statistically significant difference concerns low-tech manufacturing firms, which are slightly 
overrepresented in the sample. 
12 Given the data source, we need to assume that self-reporting qualitatively reflects the underlying data. Prior 
work (e.g. Haegeland & Møen, 2007) has shown that this is a legitimate assumption. 
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anchoring bias of respondents and make the empirical analysis more robust, the Likert-scale 
responses have been recoded into dichotomous variables.13 Our empirical approach then boils 
down to comparing the answers for the companies that were also granted an R&D subsidy 
with those of companies that only benefited from the tax credit. 
3.3. Method 
Our aim is to identify the additionality created by the policy mix of tax credits combined with 
subsidies. Similarly to Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), our sample includes only users of the tax 
credit, with the ‘treated’ firms those that also benefit from an R&D subsidy. The outcome 
variables measure the effect of the tax credit, so the treatment captures whether the behavioral 
additionality due to the tax credit is moderated by the receipt of an R&D subsidy, the latter 
measured using a dummy variable. 
We use 𝑦!"!  to denote the behavioral outcome 𝑚 of firm 𝑖 if it receives both R&D subsidies 
and tax credits (𝑆 = 1), and 𝑦!"!  for the same outcome of the same firm if it uses only tax 
credits (𝑆 = 0). Note that only one outcome is observed for each firm. Ignoring this issue for 
the moment, the effect for a firm 𝑖 enjoying the policy mix of using both tax credits and 
subsidies instead of only tax credits is given by 𝐸 𝑦!"! − 𝑦!"! |𝑆 = 1 . Empirically, the 
treatment effect for outcome 𝑚 is then calculated as 𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇! = 1𝑁! 𝑦!"! − 𝑦!"!!|!!!  
with 𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇 denoting the Sample Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and 𝑁! the number 
of treated firms. It is not possible to directly calculate the effect of using both measures since 
only one outcome is observed for each firm i.e. there is a missing data problem (Heckman et 
al., 1997). The idea behind a matching approach is to find a proxy for the missing outcome by 
finding another firm with similar characteristics 𝑋!!"#$!!"# but that only uses tax credits. The 
matching on observable characteristics addresses the problem of potential non-random 
selection of firms into the treatment, provided that the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) holds  (Rubin, 1977). This means that the treatment and potential outcome are assumed 
independent for firms with the same set of exogenous characteristics: 𝑦!"! ,𝑦!"!      S!|𝑋!!"#$!!"# = 𝑥 
                                                
13 In particular, ‘high’ and ‘very high’ levels of agreement are coded 1 while lower levels or absence of 
agreement on influence are coded 0.  
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In addition, we impose the so-called common support restriction, which means that for all 
treated firms a valid counterpart should be present in the control group, and, conversely, every 
tax credit user should represent a potential subsidy recipient.14  
Under these assumptions, we can rewrite the SATT as the mean difference of the matched 
samples: 
𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇! = 1𝑁 𝑦!"! |𝑆 = 1,𝑋!!"#$!!"# = 𝑥 − 𝑦!"! |𝑆 = 0,𝑋!!"#$!!"# = 𝑥!!!!  
Note that due to the nature of the survey questions, the matching design effectively yields a 
difference-in-differences estimation of the treatment effect. In particular, companies were 
asked what the additional effect of the R&D tax credit was on the scale, speed, etc. of their 
R&D. Thus, the answers represent the difference between the pre-treatment period t0 and the 
post-treatment period t1, the latter being the moment when the survey was conducted, in 2011. 
Different methods exist to matching the treated firms with their most similar counterparts in 
the control group. We use the propensity score, 𝑃 𝑆 = 1|𝑋!!"#$!!"# , introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), which is estimated using a probit regression. Subsequently, 
each treated company is matched to one firm from the control group based on the propensity 
score.15 Matching treated and control firms using merely the propensity score can be a too 
coarse approach in the sense that it may mean that although a treated firm gets matched to a 
control firm with a similar score, they may still differ substantially in one or more of the key 
matching variables. Hybrid matching (Lechner, 1998) tries to trade off the benefits of the 
dimensionality reduction through propensity score matching on the one hand and the more 
accurate matching on individual covariates on the other hand, by combining the propensity 
scores with one or more ‘key’ matching variables. However, a condition for increasing the 
quality of matching this way is a sufficiently large control group so adequate matching 
partners can be found. Given the relatively small size of our sample, we therefore opted for a 
different approach that matches only on the propensity score. 16 Following the matching, we 
run follow-up regressions including – besides the treatment variable – the earlier matching 
variables to correct for any remaining imbalance in the covariates (Iacus et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, we exploit the fact that we observe multiple behavioral outcomes in these 
                                                
14 In practice, this comes down to discarding all treated firms with propensity scores larger than the maximum 
and smaller than the minimum in the control group. 
15 We employ single nearest neighbor matching with replacement i.e. control firms are not removed from the 
pool of potential controls after matching with a treated firm. We follow this approach to ensure good quality 
matches given the specific composition of our sample: the treatment group is larger than the number of possible 
controls because most companies that have accessed tax credits also have used subsidies. 
16 As further support for matching on propensity score only, Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that using more 
than one continuous covariate for matching may result in a matching discrepancy of stochastic order 𝑁!/! with 𝐾 the number of continuous matching variables and 𝑁 the number of observations to match. If 𝐾 = 1, the 
matching estimator is 𝑁-consistent. 
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adjustment regressions by estimating a multivariate probit model, which allows for correlation 
between unobserved factors driving the behavioral outcomes of a single firm (while still 
requiring the error terms to be uncorrelated across firms) and hence a more efficient 
estimation. An additional benefit of the post-matching regressions is that they allow analyzing 
whether behavioral additionality depends on the importance of tax credits for the firm and/or 
the ratio of subsidies versus tax credits. We reckon this approach represents a reasonable 
trade-off between achieving a good-quality matching and accommodating the benefits and 
drawbacks of the available data. 
We estimate the following 4-equation multivariate probit model of the behavioral 
additionality effects of tax credits: 𝑦!"∗ = 𝛼! + 𝛽!"#$!!"!!𝑋!!"#$!!"# + 𝛽!"#!!𝑋!!"#! + 𝛽!"!!𝑋!!"# + 𝜀!"  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑚 = 1. .4 𝑦!" = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑦!"∗ > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑋!!"#$!!"#  denote the matching variables, which are included to control for remaining 
imbalance. 𝑋!!"#!  denotes whether firm 𝑖  received a subsidy, and 𝑋!!"# measures the 
importance of the tax credit for firm 𝑖. The error terms 𝜀!" are assumed multivariate normal17 
with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix 𝑉  where 𝜌!! = 1  and the off-diagional 
correlations are estimated from the data under the restriction that 𝜌!" = 𝜌!".  
Recall that the binary outcome variables 𝑦!" have been coded as 1 if the respondent at least 
agrees or strongly agrees there is an effect on the corresponding behavioral outcome, which is 
consistent with the idea of a latent variable 𝑦!"∗  exceeding a threshold value.   
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Matching 
For the matching estimator, we include a range of variables that may be expected to affect the 
probability of a firm using both tax credits and subsidies as opposed to only tax credits. Note 
that since all firms in the sample make use of R&D tax credits, they may be expected to be 
relatively homogenous in the sense that all of them use public R&D support. While prior 
work provides little guidance on the precise characteristics that may distinguish, within the 
group of tax credit users, between subsidized and non-subsidized firms, we will draw on the 
matching literature to identify relevant matching variables.  
Following Lhuillery et al. (2013) we first account for R&D intensity, measured as the 
percentage of researchers relative to the total number of employees. Note that many matching 
studies have analyzed input additionality and therefore used R&D investments as a dependent 
                                                
17 In our estimation of the model, we specified 30 random draws from the multivariate standard normal 
distribution to be used for calculating the simulated maximum likelihood function in each iteration. This exceeds 
the guideline of using at least 𝑁 with 𝑁 the number of observations (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). 
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variable rather than a covariate in the matching process. However, we study behavioral 
additionality i.e. how firms use their resources for R&D and therefore aim to make control 
firms comparable to treated firms in terms of the importance of R&D. If this variable were 
absent from the matching model, the possibility would remain that firms for which R&D is 
their ‘core business’ get matched to firms for which it is a less dominant activity. 
Furthermore, using R&D intensity as a matching variable is an additional way to control for 
industry (Mathieu & Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2010), besides the explicit industry 
classification we use, which is necessarily aggregate due to the relatively small size of the 
dataset. In particular, we use dummies for high- and low-tech manufacturing and service 
industries, following Eurostat guidelines.18  Industry affiliation has also been shown to be a 
factor in the decision to grant subsidies to firms. Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), for Finland, 
show that government funding disproportionately helps firms from industries that depend 
more on external financing.  An important methodological concern about using R&D intensity 
as a matching variable is that it may be endogenous to the receipt of R&D subsidies as a grant 
may allow a firm to hire additional researchers. In other words, we need the pre-treatment 
R&D intensity, net of R&D employees financed through subsidies. Since we do not have 
information on the precise timing of subsidies – companies merely reported in the survey 
whether they benefited from an R&D subsidy or not – we use the following approach to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns. We rely on the observation that there is high persistence in 
who benefits from R&D subsidies (Busom et al., 2012). Therefore, we corrected a 
(subsidized) firm’s R&D intensity in the first year it is observed in the period of analysis 
(2006-2010) by using information in the survey on the relative importance for the firm of 
subsidies compared to tax credits, in the period 2006-2010. Jointly with the information on 
the amount of tax credit enjoyed by the firm, this allowed us to correct for the number of 
R&D workers supported by subsidies, and hence to calculate a ‘subsidy-free’ R&D intensity. 
Company size has been found to have an impact on the use of public R&D support (Almus & 
Czarnitzki, 2003; Blanes & Busom, 2004; D. Czarnitzki & Licht, 2005; Aerts & Schmidt, 
2008). We control for size by using the logarithm of the number of employees. 
The experience of a firm in actively seeking and using other forms of R&D support may serve 
as a signal for its use of subsidies (Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2013; Lhuillery et al., 2013). 
Hence we include a dummy (taxleader) capturing whether the firm used tax credits in 2006, 
the year the measure was introduced. 
A firm’s financial health is of importance when applying for subsidies because financially 
constrained firms need external financing sources more acutely (Caiumi, 2010; Kobayashi, 
2011; Lhuillery et al., 2013), but at the same time they might not be primary targets for policy 
makers because of their uncertain financial future. We control for financial health by using the 
                                                
18 Also note that the use of a general industry classification is likely to be less relevant in our setting since only 
R&D-active companies are considered (Teirlinck et al., 2010). 
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current ratio, defined as current liabilities to current assets - a frequently used measure to 
capture the firm's financial position (Bromiley, 1991; Latham & Braun, 2010). 
Finally, given that authority over R&D subsidy policy accrues to the regional governments, 
we include dummies for the three Belgian regions – Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels 
Capital Region. As studies in other countries have also found (Santamaría et al., 2010), the 
decentralization of policies leaves room for differentiation in terms of subsidy eligibility 
criteria, focus on specific industries, etc. 
Means and proportions of the variables used for matching and the behavioral outcome 
variables are shown in the first and second panel of Table 1, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
As expected from prior research (Bérubé & Mohnen, 2009), users of tax credits do not seem 
to differ very much from users of both tax credits and R&D subsidies. Indeed, in terms of 
R&D intensity, short-term financial health, industry membership and regional distribution, the 
two groups are rather balanced. However, significant differences in the averages of size and 
whether the firms used tax credits from their introduction point towards the necessity of 
balancing the two groups. 
The second panel shows that there are significant differences in outcomes for the treated and 
potential control firms. On average, users of the policy mix reckon that the tax credit has 
increased the scale, speed, relative orientation towards research as well as the number of 
concurrent projects more than users of the tax credit only. 
Table 2 shows the results of the probit estimation of the propensity to use both tax credits and 
R&D subsidies. As expected, companies that have used the tax credit since 2006 (tax leader) 
have a higher probability of also using subsidies. This confirms the intuition that these firms 
are more savvy at using different types of public support measures for R&D. Further, the 
matching results indicate that the control group (non-users of subsidies) contains on average 
more R&D-intensive and larger firms. This is in line with the target aim of subsidies towards 
commercialization and with particular attention to SMEs (Teirlinck & Spithoven, 2012). 
Bérubé and Mohnen (2009) find similar results for company size in their matching study, 
using an analogous treatment definition. Note however that these results should not be 
interpreted as general predictors of using R&D subsidies, but rather serve to identify 
differences in observable characteristics between treated and control firms. 
Although the other variables such as industry affiliation and region have no significant effect 
on the probability to use R&D subsidies, they contribute to model fit and thus the overall 
balance between treated and control firms in the propensity score matching in the next step.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Since 10 treated companies are outside the common support region, the sample is reduced 
from 192 to 182 companies. The first panel of Table 3 confirms that none of the matching 
variables show significant differences in the means between the treated and control firms, 
indicating satisfactory balance. While the impact of the matching exercise on the sample is 
very modest, it has mainly served to assure that none of the subsequent results are driven by 
atypical firms. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 shows the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for each outcome. The share of 
firms reporting that the tax credit has allowed them to speed up R&D projects and/or increase 
the relative orientation of research versus development is substantially and significantly 
higher for recipients of R&D subsidies relative to those firms that only benefit from tax 
credits. Although the ATTs are also positive for the scale and number of R&D projects 
undertaken by firms, these effects are not significant. These results partially support our 
hypothesis on the positive interaction effect of R&D subsidies on the behavioral additionality 
of tax credits (H2). 
[Insert table 4 here] 
We now further ascertain the robustness of these results in a regression framework, which 
allows adding additional controls for imbalance between treated and control firms, and 
provide the more flexible specifications needed to test our hypotheses. 
4.2. Regression analysis 
Our first hypothesis states that the behavioral additionality effects of R&D tax credits increase 
with the importance of these tax credits for the firm. We test it by including the importance of 
the tax credit to the firm as a fractional variable19. The results20 in Table 5 show that tax 
credits are not found to have an impact on the scale and speed of R&D. However, firms with a 
higher share of employees benefiting from R&D tax credits exhibit stronger additionality in 
terms of the number of R&D projects in their portfolio, and – although only marginally 
significant – a stronger research orientation versus development. The reason behind this effect 
could be that specialized human capital is a key input into R&D, and its lower cost induces 
significant changes in the way companies organize this process. In particular, the differential 
effects across outcomes lend themselves to the interpretation that firms, given an increasing 
reliance on R&D tax credits, invest more in highly-qualified human capital and that this 
allows them to fundamentally rearrange their approach to R&D rather than (merely) focus on 
                                                
19 The importance of the tax credit is measured as the share of R&D personnel (in headcounts) that benefitted 
from the tax credit in the most recent year. 
20 Note that we focus on the interpretation of the signs and statistical significance of the parameters, as 
evaluation of marginal effects is not trivial in multivariate probit models considering more than two outcomes 
(Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003; Mullahy, 2011). Moreover, the average treatment effects reported in the previous 
section indicated the increase in the share of companies showing the various types of behavioral additionality. 
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scale or efficiency.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The matching variables are included in the regressions to adjust for remaining imbalances in 
between treated and control firms and show significant results in a few cases, e.g. R&D 
intensity and industry. We also add indicators for the role of demand-pull and technology-
push. More specifically, firms were asked in the survey whether these factors had an influence 
on the decision to perform additional R&D. The results show that only technology push has a 
significant, positive impact on the scale, speed and research orientation of projects. Finally, 
firms in the Brussels Capital Region are more likely to use tax credits to increase scale and 
speed of R&D than firms in Flanders and, to a lesser extent, Wallonia. A possible reason is 
the strong presence in Brussels of firms in IT (mainly software and consulting) for which 
R&D is arguably less science-based and more centered on short lead times, which may not be 
picked up by the industry dummies (Teirlinck & Spithoven, 2008). Furthermore, firms in 
Flanders and Wallonia seem to experience less influence of the R&D tax credit on the scale 
and speed of their R&D than firms located in Brussels. 
Our second hypothesis stated that the behavioral additionality effects of R&D tax credits are 
stronger for firms that also receive an R&D subsidy versus firms that only benefit from tax 
credits. We test it by including, alongside the variable for tax credit importance, a dummy for 
firms that have also received subsidies. The multivariate probit results presented in Table 6 
reveals that receiving the policy mix of tax credits and subsidies has positive and significant 
effects on all the outcomes we analyze. While the effect of the tax importance variable 
remains significant on the Research vs Development and nr of projects equations (which is 
consistent with the previous model), the effect of receiving subsidies is significant across all 
four specifications. However, Wald tests show that the positive moderating effect of subsidies 
on tax credits is significantly higher for the nr of projects than for scale and speed of R&D. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As argued in section 2, the underlying mechanism that results in the positive interaction 
between subsidies and tax credits may relate to the learning effects following the competition 
for R&D grants and – if successful – the direction they provide for additional investments, 
such as those made possible by tax credits.  Even for financially less constrained firms that do 
not need subsidies to set up R&D projects, there may be a ‘disciplining role’ performed by the 
subsidy application process. While firms may have their own structured approach to initiate 
R&D projects, in order to obtain an R&D grant, firms need to write a proposal in which they 
think through the entire project, anticipate external reviewer comments, establish connections 
with potential R&D partners, etc. This is a learning experience for the firm, which it may not 
be able to reproduce entirely in internal processes and which creates a fertile basis for the use 
of tax credits. Once the firm is awarded an R&D grant, the resulting project may perform as a 
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focal point to which additional R&D resources can be productively allocated. 
We have also verified whether the relative importance of subsidies versus tax credits has an 
influence on the moderating effect of subsidies. However, conditional on receipt of a subsidy, 
we do not find that the precise proportions in the policy mix have an impact (see Table 7 in 
Appendix).  
5. Conclusions 
This paper addressed behavioral additionality effects of tax credits and considered these 
effects within a broader policy mix. Within the policy mix we investigated the influence of a 
treatment effect by means of R&D subsidies for companies benefitting from tax credits. 
Our empirical evidence relates to a representative dataset of R&D active companies 
benefitting from R&D tax credits in Belgium in the period 2006-2010. These tax credits have 
been introduced in the year 2006 by means of a tax deduction on the wages of highly qualified 
researchers. Scale, speed, number of projects, and research orientation of the projects have 
been investigated based on a firm based survey measuring the effects by referring to the 
counterfactual situation that no tax credits would have been obtained. We combine propensity 
score matching with multivariate probit models to control for possible selection bias usually 
present in analyses regarding the effects of subsidy or tax credit frameworks. We are aware of 
the necessity of further research on behavioral additionality of the tax credit and on the topic 
of policy mix, especially on an international scale. 
The first key contribution of our analysis is that it considers behavioral additionality effects of 
tax credits, complementing the literature on input and output additionality. We find that tax 
credits lead to behavioral additionality effects in specific dimensions of firm decision-making. 
In particular, tax credits cause firms not to ‘do more of the same’ (scale) nor ‘do the same 
thing faster’ (speed) but rather make more far-reaching changes to their R&D approach. 
Initiating additional projects and/or tipping the R&D-balance more towards research are 
decisions that firms arguably do not take overnight and may be expected to have a lasting 
impact on the firm’s R&D processes. Our finding that the effects on firm decision making 
increase with the importance of the tax credit for the firm can be seen as an argument in favor 
of a volume-based tax credit system in the sense that firms respond more strongly as the 
benefit increases. This attenuates concerns about the effectiveness of tax credits that have 
been raised in the literature, such as using them to fund R&D projects that yield the highest 
private return rather than the ones that should be promoted from a social point of view (Hall 
& Van Reenen, 2000), or opportunistic relabeling of expenses as research activities (Antonelli 
& Crespi, 2013). 
Besides the role of the (importance of) tax credits as such, the other main insight in this paper 
is that R&D subsidies have a positive moderating effect on the behavioral additionality of tax 
credits. We do not find evidence for any additional effects of the precise proportion of 
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subsidies and tax credits in the policy mix. A first implication of the ‘leverage’ of tax credits 
by subsidies is that a comprehensive R&D policy requires communication between the public 
authorities managing different mechanisms. Especially in the case of multi-level policy 
making, such as in our setting where federal and regional governments are responsible for 
different support measures, understanding the spillovers between instruments ensures overall 
policy coherence.  
The finding of an interaction effect also raises questions with respect to ‘picking the winner’ 
strategies R&D funding agencies are (accused of) following. Whether this positive effect of 
subsidies on behavioral additionality of tax credits would hold if one expanded the set of 
subsidy beneficiaries is far from certain. Because of selection issues, firms that are currently 
not applying for subsidies may not use them as productively if they also received a grant. 
Indeed, prior research has shown that ‘picking the winner’ strategies are not necessarily a bad 
choice since they may result in a ‘virtuous Matthew effect’ (Antonelli & Crespi, 2013). 
Leaving aside the issue of the feasibility of exploiting the policy mix effect across a broader 
set of firms, a key takeaway from our results is that firms deal in thoughtful ways with 
available resources for R&D. However, while our results establish that subsidies affect the 
way tax credits are utilized, further qualitative research is called for to better understand the 
micro-foundations of the interaction effect. Avenues for future research include the 
construction of larger datasets in order to more accurately estimate additionality effects. This 
goal could be achieved by the introduction of additionality-related surveys in more OECD or 
EU countries, following the example of the Belgian Science Policy Office’s survey providing 
us with the data analysed in this paper. Finally, the consideration of longer time periods 
beyond the period of economic and financial turbulence that characterized our dataset would 
strengthen the generalizability of the results. 
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6. Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics, pre-matching  
variable 
tax credits only 
n=75 
tax credits + R&D subsidies 
n=117 
 
p-value 
 Matching variables 
R&D intensity 26% 24% 0.72 
ln(employees) 3.86 3.18 0.01 
Tax leader 24% 38% 0.05 
Current ratio 1.80 2.11 0.27 
High-tech manuf. 21% 19% 0.67 
High-tech serv. 27% 39% 0.09 
Low-tech serv. 12% 9% 0.57 
Low-tech manuf. 35% 31% 0.58 
Brussels 8% 9% 0.89 
Flanders 67% 63% 0.63 
Wallonia 25% 28% 0.66 
 Outcome variables 
Scale 51% 65% 0.05 
Speed 43% 61% 0.01 
R versus D 24% 52% 0.00 
Projects 45% 62% 0.03 
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Table 2 Probit model for the use of tax credits and subsidies 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
R&D intensity -0.91** 0.38 
ln(employees) -0.20*** 0.07 
Tax leader 0.52** 0.22 
Current ratio 0.04 0.07 
High-tech manuf. 0.00 0.27 
High-tech serv. 0.30 0.28 
Low-tech serv, -0.21 0.35 
Flanders 0.14 0.37 
Wallonia 0.07 0.39 
Constant 0.78 0.51 
N 
 
192 
LR chi2(9) 
 
19.35 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.02 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.07 
Log likelihood -118.77 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of matched sample 
variable tax credit only tax credit & R&D subsidies p>T 
R&D intensity 26% 25% 0.99 
ln(employees) 3.86 3.24 0.69 
Tax leader 24% 35% 0.89 
Current ratio 1.80 1.93 0.82 
High-tech manuf. 21% 20% 0.37 
High-tech serv. 27% 34% 0.56 
Low-tech serv. 12% 10% 0.67 
Low-tech manuf. 35% 34% 0.67 
Brussels 8% 8% 0.27 
Flanders 67% 65% 0.57 
Wallonia 25% 27% 1.00 
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Table 4 Average treatment effect on the treated 
Variable Treated Controls Difference  T-stat 
Scale 63% 49% 14%  1.31 
Speed 59% 36% 22%**  2.11 
R vs D 53% 26% 27%**  2.77 
Projects 60% 42% 18%  1.66 
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Table 5 Multivariate probit model testing H1 
  scale speed R vs D nr of projects 
  coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. 
Tax importance 0.29 0.32 0.17 0.32 0.59* 0.32 1.58*** 0.36 
R&D intensity 0.31 0.41 0.28 0.37 0.21 0.39 0.78** 0.40 
ln(employees) -0.11 0.07 -0.05 0.07 -0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Tax leader 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.22 
Current ratio -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.08 -0.14 0.09 -0.02 0.08 
High-tech manuf. -0.24 0.29 -0.24 0.30 0.47* 0.28 0.40 0.30 
High-tech serv. -0.16 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.13 0.26 
Low-tech serv. -0.09 0.37 -0.26 0.38 0.14 0.36 0.48 0.37 
Demand pull -0.02 0.29 -0.53* 0.30 -0.51 0.32 -0.04 0.29 
Tech. push 1.29*** 0.47 1.40*** 0.39 1.35** 0.59 0.51 0.48 
Flanders -1.22*** 0.40 -0.87** 0.41 0.46 0.38 -0.28 0.35 
Wallonia -1.07*** 0.41 -0.41 0.44 0.26 0.40 0.09 0.38 
N 179 
Log pseudolikelihood -346.29 
Wald test ( ²) 107.6*** 
LR test of all r=0 (χ²) 181.66*** 
Note: Wald tests show that the coefficient of Tax importance for the ‘nr of projects’-equation is significantly 
different from the other equations. 
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Table 6 Multivariate probit model testing H2 
  Scale speed R vs D nr of projects 
  coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. 
Tax importance 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.33 0.83** 0.33 1.78*** 0.37 
Subsidy dummy 0.37* 0.22 0.42** 0.22 0.90*** 0.22 0.62*** 0.22 
R&D intensity 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.52 0.39 1.01** 0.41 
ln(employees) -0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.12* 0.07 
Tax leader 0.12 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.00 0.22 
Current ratio -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.17* 0.09 -0.03 0.08 
High-tech manuf. -0.25 0.29 -0.25 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.39 0.31 
High-tech serv. -0.21 0.27 0.03 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.08 0.27 
Low-tech serv. -0.08 0.37 -0.23 0.36 0.26 0.37 0.57 0.38 
Demand pull 0.01 0.29 -0.48 0.30 -0.41 0.35 0.05 0.30 
Tech. push 1.33*** 0.50 1.41*** 0.39 1.32** 0.67 0.51 0.51 
Flanders -1.24*** 0.42 -0.91** 0.40 0.38 0.40 -0.33 0.36 
Wallonia -1.07** 0.43 -0.44 0.43 0.20 0.42 0.08 0.39 
N 179 
Log pseudolikelihood -336.70 
Wald test (c²) 157.53*** 
LR test of all r=0 (c²) 166.22*** 
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7. Appendix 
 
Table 7 Multivariate probit model including dummies for importance of subsidies 
  scale speed R vs D nr of projects 
  coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. 
Tax importance 0.40 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.92*** 0.35 1.78*** 0.40 
Subsidy dummy 0.58** 0.29 0.58* 0.30 1.11*** 0.31 0.56* 0.31 
Subs. imp. 0-25% -0.19 0.43 -0.02 0.42 -0.19 0.44 0.26 0.48 
Subs. imp. 25-50% -0.16 0.35 -0.39 0.35 -0.06 0.36 -0.26 0.37 
Subs. imp. 50-75% -0.57 0.39 -0.35 0.39 0.00 0.42 0.17 0.41 
R&D intensity 0.69 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.59 0.43 0.88* 0.45 
ln(employees) -0.07 0.09 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Tax leader 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.24 -0.11 0.24 -0.04 0.23 
Current ratio -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.19** 0.09 -0.01 0.08 
High-tech manuf. -0.21 0.32 -0.27 0.33 0.70** 0.33 0.36 0.34 
High-tech serv. -0.23 0.28 0.01 0.29 0.22 0.28 0.05 0.28 
Low-tech serv. -0.13 0.39 -0.27 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.59 0.39 
Demand pull -0.03 0.30 -0.51* 0.29 -0.48 0.37 -0.06 0.31 
Tech. push 1.36*** 0.53 1.39*** 0.42 1.15* 0.68 0.68 0.57 
Flanders -1.22*** 0.43 -0.89** 0.42 0.42 0.43 -0.30 0.37 
Wallonia -1.08** 0.45 -0.44 0.44 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.39 
N 166 
Log pseudolikelihood -306.93 
Wald test (c²) 258.52*** 
LR test of all r=0 (c²) 150.02*** 
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